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Abstract
For few years, the emergence of private standards has been a major concern for de-
veloping countries that have managed to achieve substantial exports of fresh produces.
It is often argued that the emergence of food standards will lead to marginalization
of those farmers who are not able to comply with requirements. In this paper, we in-
vestigate a very special case of food standard emergence where certiﬁcation costs are
entirely supported by exporters themselves, often with ﬁnancial support and technical
assistance from donors and trade facilitators. We use a quasi-experimental approach
to estimate the causal eﬀect of certiﬁcation on certiﬁed export farmers' marketing
performance. The results suggest indeed an impact of certiﬁcation on quantities. On
average, currently certiﬁed producers sell larger quantities than their matched coun-
terparts but this is almost uncorrelated to farmers performances since certiﬁcation is
highly driven by market forces and external assistance. Moreover we are able to show
that ex-certiﬁed farmers do not beneﬁt from certiﬁcation's impact afterward.
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1 Introduction
For few years, private standards have played an increasingly role in the export of fresh
fruits and vegetables. Compliance with private standards for FFV now seems inevitable for
exporting developing countries. The emergence of private standards is a major concern for
developing countries that have managed to achieve substantial exports of fresh produces.
At the same time, it is often argued that the emergence of food standards will lead to
marginalization of those farmers who are not able to comply with requirements. In this
paper, we investigate a very special case of food standard emergence where certiﬁcation
costs are entirely supported by exporters themselves, often with ﬁnancial support and
technical assistance from donors and trade facilitators.
The eﬀects of private standards, although widely discussed from a theoretical point of
view (Hammoudi et al., 2009; Henson and Humphrey, 2010; Swinnen and Vandemoortele,
2009), remain rarely assessed on the basis of empirical analyses. Interestingly, existing em-
pirical studies do not test the hypothesis that food standards tend to exclude smallholders
from export value chains. Instead, they stress collateral positive eﬀects of certiﬁcation
such as increased salaried employment (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009) or improved health
outcomes among farmers (Asfaw et al., 2009 and 2010).1
In the empirical literature, the identiﬁcation strategy is not always convincing, for
reasons that are inherent to the research question. We argue that more attention should
be paid to the validity of the assumptions underlying quasi-experimental techniques. In
particular, we should wonder whether we are able to ﬁnd a control group while food
standards are likely/designed to aﬀect the fresh fruit market as a whole. We argue that
the speciﬁcity of the Malagasy experience with GlobalGAP standard provides us a rare
opportunity to properly assess the direct impact of certiﬁcation on marketing performances
of smallholders.
We use a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the causal eﬀect of certiﬁcation
on certiﬁed export farmers' marketing performance. Performance is measured through
traded volumes (in tons) and selling prices (in Malagasy ariary/kg). As exporters pay for
certiﬁcation, they are expected to buy litchis from certiﬁed farmers ﬁrst; we thus expected
1One exception being Henson, Masakure, and Cranﬁeld (2011) who try to estimate the impact of
certiﬁcation on exporters' revenue rather than focusing on smallholders.
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a positive impact on sold quantities at the producer level. Moreover, exporters who sell
certiﬁed litchis may beneﬁt from a price premium; this may translate in a price premium
for farmers too. But actually, we did not expect such an impact as previous qualitative
evidence indicates that certiﬁcation do not guarantee price premium at the exporter level.
Finally, the results suggest indeed an impact of certiﬁcation on quantities. On average,
currently certiﬁed producers sell larger quantities than their matched counterparts. They
sell about 5.6 tons, 1 to 1.6 tons more than their matches. We fail to detect a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on prices, except for a very speciﬁc group of litchi growers, grouped in association
of producers, all of whom being certiﬁed. Moreover, we provide some answers to the
questions raised in impact analyses of food standards. Do exporters who want to increase
the proportion of certiﬁed products to better meet European demand cheat by sourcing
ex-certiﬁed farmers? Otherwise stated: do ex-certiﬁed farmers still beneﬁt from positive
impact of certiﬁcation - if there is any?
This paper is organized as follows: the litchi export sector in Madagascar and the
emergence of Global Gap standards in presented in section 2; the empirical framework and
identiﬁcation strategy are discussed in section 3; the data used in the paper are presented
in section 4; results are presented in section 5; and section 6 concludes.
2 Litchi export sector in Madagascar and Global Gap stan-
dards
Litchi value chain An island country located oﬀ the southeastern coast of Africa, Madagas-
car is essentially an agricultural economy: the primary sector accounted for 27% of GDP in
2006, although agricultural productivity seems to be declining (Maret, 2009). Madagascar
is the main litchi supplier for the European Union. In 2006, the total value of litchi exports
reached nearly USD 3 million (almost 9% of all exports) (World Bank, 2007). Since 2004,
Madagascar exports an average volume of 20,000 metric tons each year.
The litchi production area extends over 800 km along the eastern coastline between
Toamasina and Fort Dauphin and involves over 30,000 families (Thierry and Schneider,
2007). Total annual production was estimated at roughly 180,000-200,000 metric tons
between 2003 and 2006 (World Bank, 2007). For logistic reasons, the production area for
3
exported litchis is concentrated around the island's main harbor: Toamasina (Tamatave)
and the neighboring districts of Vavatenina, Fénérive-Est, Tamatave II, Brickaville and
Vatomandry. In Europe, litchi consumption is both highly seasonal and very short: litchis
from Madagascar arrive in Europe between mid-November and mid-January. As a result of
such concentration in time (the campaign lasts 3 months) and space (Toamasina province),
a variety of actors temporarily participate in litchi related activities (pickers, collectors,
transporters, exporters) before returning to other activities the rest of the year.
Around 30 exporters operate in Toamasina. Exporters work through collectors and
directly with producers for their litchi supply. In both cases they pay in advance for their
litchis. The rest of the year, these companies export other commodities. Exporters are in
charge of sorting and applying chemical treatment to the litchis, packaging and bringing
the litchis to the boats. Exporters are quite a heterogeneous group in terms of turnover
activity. While some exporters only operate during the litchi season and do not have their
own packaging unit, others collect large volumes of litchis and are in relation with several
importers. Recently, some exporters started producing litchis themselves in large orchards.
Over 3,000 collectors operate in the area (World Bank, 2007). Two main types of
collectors can be distinguished: (a) professional collectors - who also collect cloves, vanilla,
pepper, coﬀee, the rest of the year - are based in Toamasina. They work with one or
several exporters and have their own network of trusted suppliers to whom they provide
cash advances and technical advice; they only collect litchis for the export market; (b)
more occasional collectors from Toamasina or Antananarivo, whose participation depends
on market opportunities, on the availability of a vehicle to bring the litchis to the exporters'
treatment plants and packaging units. These operators sell to the exporters by queuing in
front of their treatment plants. They have no contract with the producers and may switch
producers from one year to another. One the export season is over, they sell the remaining
litchis on local markets or in Antananarivo.
Most litchi producers (80 to 90%) only own a few trees - less than 20 - that are scattered
on their plots. Trees are not very well tended and receive little inputs. The main activity
is the organization of the harvest using both family and seasonal workers from neighboring
villages. Workers are in charge of picking, sorting and packaging the litchis in traditional
baskets (garaba). Most producers have little knowledge about markets and depend on the
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collectors to market their litchis.
EU requirements Under the Everything but Arms agreement (2001), Madagascar enjoys
a duty-free and quota free access to the European Union for fruits and vegetables (Minten,
Randrianarison, and Swinnen, 2009). However, important public regulations limiting the
entry of fresh fruit and vegetable into the EU include: EC Regulations 396/2005 and
178/2006 on pesticide regulation and the general food safety regulation imposing trace-
ability of food products within the EU (EC regulation 178/2002) (Codron, Giraud-Heraud,
and Soler, 2005). In the case of imported products such as litchis, it is the responsibility of
the importer to ensure compliance with the relevant requirements. The main private qual-
ity standard used in the EU for fresh produce is GlobalGAP, a collective standard created
by European food retailers in 1997 in response to consumer health concerns. GlobalGAP is
a set of guidelines established to ensure the hygiene and safety of agricultural products. As
most litchi trees are unattended, GlobalGAP focuses mainly on harvest (access to clean wa-
ter for pre-harvest hand washing, packaging of litchis) and post-harvest procedures (safety,
hygiene and working conditions at the sulfur treatment plant, respect of maximum residue
limits). Litchi producers may be certiﬁed individually (option 1) or as a group (option 2).
Certiﬁcation is obtained when passing an on-farm inspection and paying a fee that must
be renewed every year. Quality management systems must be developed to ensure safe
pesticide use, and compliance with handling and hygiene standards. Last, exporters must
be able to trace production back to a speciﬁc farm from which it was procured in order to
ensure the compliance of the product with the standard. Compliance with the standard
involves ﬁxed costs (e.g. the construction of sheds and of latrines with running water)
and recurring costs (e.g. record keeping of all farm activities related to the production
of the certiﬁed crop, both at the individual and the group level, monitoring costs). Re-
cently, some exporters have received ﬁnancial support from donors as part of development
project. In particular, the year 2007 was characterized by a peak in the number of certiﬁed
producers in the country (over 1,000 based on the evidence of certiﬁcation bodies). After
the withdrawal of donors, it is clear that the number of certiﬁed producers has declined
substantially. The relationship between the Malagasy litchi producers and exporters can
be analyzed in the conceptual framework proposed by Barrett, Bachke, Bellemare, Michel-
son, Narayanan, and Walker (2011), where ﬁrms (exporters here) make the contracting
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choice sequentially: ﬁrst, they choose where to locate its procurements activities (Toa-
masina and the neighboring districts of Vavatenina, Fénérive-Est, Tamatave II, Brickaville
and Vatomandry); second, they choose speciﬁc farmers who are able to comply with their
requirements; thirdly, farmers may accept or not (in the Malagasy case, qualitative evi-
dence shows that costs supported by farmers are actually negligible compared to exporters'
costs).
3 Empirical framework
We use a quasi-experimental approach to estimate the causal eﬀect of certiﬁcation on cer-
tiﬁed export farmers' marketing performance. Performance is measured through traded
volumes (in tons) and selling prices (in Malagasy ariary/kg). As exporters pay for cer-
tiﬁcation, they are expected to buy litchis from certiﬁed farmers ﬁrst; we thus expect a
positive impact on sold quantities at the producer level. Moreover, exporters who sell
certiﬁed litchis may beneﬁt from a price premium; this may translate in a price premium
for farmers too.
The quality of the data collected allowed us to use diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DID)
matching estimators2: nearest-neighbor matching (Abadie, Drukker, Herr, and Imbens,
2004), kernel-based matching, and local linear matching (Leuven and Sianesi, 2003). Such
matching strategy allows for temporally invariant diﬀerences in outcomes between certiﬁed
and uncertiﬁed farmers. Description of estimators used is given in Table 1.
The validity of matching estimators relies on strong statistical assumptions. And yet,
we argue that in the special case of Madagascar, we can reasonably suppose that they hold.
First, based on qualitative evidence, we can safely assume that the conditional indepen-
dence condition will be valid because there are actually few factors that could be sources of
selection bias and we are able to observe them. Indeed, main determinants of certiﬁcation
status of exporters are: pressure from buyers (European importers) who require compliance
2Traditional matching estimators assume that after conditioning on a set of observable characteris-
tics, outcomes are conditionally mean independent of certiﬁcation participation. However, for a variety
of reasons there may be systematic diﬀerences between participant and nonparticipant outcomes, even
after conditioning on observables that could lead to a violation of the identiﬁcation conditions required
for matching. A DID matching strategy, as deﬁned in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), and Heck-
man, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998), allows for temporally invariant diﬀerences in outcomes between
participants and nonparticipants (Todd, 2007).
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Table 1: Description of estimators
Name Deﬁnition Variances
1 NNM_PS_1 nearest neighbour (pscore, 1 match) A&I formula
2 NNM_X_1 nearest neighbour (covariates, 1 match) A&I formula
3 NNM_PS_4 nearest neighbour (pscore, 4 matches) A&I formula
4 NNM_X_4 nearest neighbour (covariates, 4 matches) A&I formula
5 NNM_PS_1 nearest neighbour (pscore, 1 match) bootstrap
6 PSM_Kernel kernel matching bootstrap
7 PSM_LLR local linear regression bootstrap
8 OLS_X OLS including covariates
9 OLS_PS OLS including pscore
with GlobalGAP standards and the existence of ﬁnancial support and technical assistance
from donors and trade facilitators. On the producers' side, determinants of certiﬁcation
are: their ability to produce large volumes, the quality of their product and their ability
to participate in GlobalGAP training course:
Pr(Di = 1|Xi) = Φ(Xiβ) (1)
where Xi represent the vector of determinants of certiﬁcation and Φ(.) is the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. Let D = 1 if farmers are treated, D = 0 if not.
Obviously, factors on the exporter side are not correlated with marketing performances
of producers and can be considered as (unobserved) instruments. Thus, by controlling
for factors on the producer side only, we are able the get rid of the selection bias. The
basic intuition behind this design is the following: when comparing currently certiﬁed
farmers to non-certiﬁed farmers with similar location, production and education levels, we
actually compare farmers who supply to two diﬀerent exporters: one who chose to pay for
certiﬁcation because of market forces and possibly with the help of ﬁnancial support and
another one who decided to give up certiﬁcation.
Secondly, the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) is central to the identi-
ﬁcation strategy. And yet, it is often diﬃcult to ignore potential general equilibrium eﬀects
when assessing the impact of food standards, as they are likely to aﬀect the FFV market
as a whole, meaning that we would not be able to ﬁnd any control group in this case.
However, in the special case of the litchi market in Madagascar, certiﬁed farmers account
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for a very small share of traded quantities. Therefore, even a signiﬁcant impact on them is
not likely to result in a general equilibrium eﬀect. This means that we can safely assume
that our control group will not be contaminated by the eﬀect of certiﬁcation - if there's
any.
Thirdly, the recent withdrawal of certiﬁcation by a large number of producers guaranties
the existence of a large common support. In other words, we are able to ﬁnd both currently
certiﬁed and no-currently certiﬁed farmers with high probability of being certiﬁed. Under
these assumptions, the DID matching estimator which compares the conditional before-
after outcomes of GG farmers with those of matched counterparts (EX certiﬁed farmers'
outcomes in this paper) can be written as follows:
∆̂DID = n−1t
∑
i=1
{
Y1ti(Xi)− Ê(Y0ti|P (Xi), Di = 0)
}
−
n−1t′
∑
j=1
{
Y0t′j(Xj)− Ê(Y0t′j |P (Xj), Dj = 0)
} (2)
where Y1 denotes the outcome of currently certiﬁed farmers (considered as treated), Y0
denotes the outcome of ex-certiﬁed farmers (considered as untreated).
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Sampling and data
The purpose of the analysis is to estimate the causal eﬀect of certiﬁcation on certiﬁed
export farmers' performance during the litchi season 2009-2010. The survey has been run
in August 2010. It has been a recall survey about what happened during the marketing
season 2009/2010. The followings topics have been investigated through the question-
naire:3 household's general characteristics, household's assets, land, litchi production, litchi
marketing, EurepGap/GlobalGap standards, other cash crops, social network, saving and
credit, other activities, health and consumption. Moreover, regarding data requirements
for the analysis, the survey also included some questions referring to the pre-certiﬁcation
period, namely season 2005-2006 .
3See the questionnaire:http://web.supagro.inra.fr/partage/subervie/MADA/Questionnaire_06_
08_10.pdf
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The targeted population is that of export producers of litchi. The study area covers
the districts of Brickaville, Vatomandry, Tamatave, Vavatenina, and Fenerive East, which
are the main exporting regions of litchis. The location map of surveyed districts is given
in Figure x. The survey covers a total of 506 producers, surveyed individually even if they
belong to a group or association. The sample includes:
• 73 farmers, who were certiﬁed during the 2009-2010 litchi season. Thereafter these
producers are named GG farmers. Hopefully, this group includes the majority of
producers actually certiﬁed in 2009-2010 across the country;
• 232 farmers, who were not currently certiﬁed in 2009-2010 but have been certiﬁed at
least once since 2005 litchi season. In what follows, they are named EX farmers.
Our sample also includes 201 farmers, who have never been certiﬁed; they are called
NEVER farmers. Although the main part of the analysis is based on comparisons be-
tween GG farmers and EX farmers (indeed, by deﬁnition matching on ex-certiﬁed farmers
gives deﬁnitively better estimates than matching on no-certiﬁed farmers who may be very
diﬀerent from certiﬁed farmers in terms of unobservable characteristics), this third group
may be used to assess potential impacts due to permanent changes induced by previous
certiﬁcation.
As practical constraints did not allow us to survey much more than 500 farmers as a
whole, the non-certiﬁed villages (where we aim at selecting a subset of potential matched
counterparts for comparison with GG-farmers) have been selected based on the following
conditions: being in the same area as GG producers; being about the same distance from
the road as GlobalGap villages; having litchi producers with a number of trees close to
that of GlobalGap villages. In practice, once the villages have been selected on the basis
of geographical criteria (distance from the road), the enumerators had to go door-to-door
randomly until they get the number of respondents that had been set for each village. This
sampling implies that the EX and NEVER groups are not representative of their respec-
tive populations. However, it increases our chances of achieving a satisfactory matching
procedure (see next section).
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4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 6 shows that, in this sample, litchi farmers who have experienced certiﬁcation (GG
and EX) do not diﬀer from other litchi farmers in terms of farm size, family size, nor
access to water, non-agricultural activity. However, they diﬀer in terms of number of trees,
production, traded volumes. Moreover, they seem to be part of a kind of professional
network as they are usually under contract with the exporter. Interestingly, litchi producers
who have never been certiﬁed have even never heard of it. This basic information conﬁrms
that certiﬁcation is driven by exporters mainly: farmers are oﬀered to be certiﬁed by
exporters themselves, meaning that farmers who produce large quantities, of good quality
and have developed the trust in their relationship with the exporter are more likely to be
chosen for certiﬁcation.
Basic statistics on the cumulative number of years as a GG producer show that it could
be one or two mainly. The majority of EX farmers (153) were certiﬁed once in 2007, the
year the number of certiﬁed producers was the highest. Our intuition is that compliance
is not a very heavy burden in the case of litchi producers in Madagascar. They must
follow one or two training per year, they even ignore the cost of certiﬁcation, meaning that
they do not pay for it. They are sometimes but not always inspected. They do not seem
constrained by the collector, at least not more than other producers.
5 Results
5.1 What are (endogenous) determinants of farmer participation in cer-
tiﬁcation?
Conditional probabilities for certiﬁcation are computed by estimating a probit model. De-
scription of observable variables in pre-certiﬁcation period are given in Table 7. Results
of probit regression are displayed in Table 2. Apart from household head's education level
and litchi sales, we failed to detect signiﬁcant factors likely to determine certiﬁcation for
2009, which is the expected result when comparing GG farmers to EX certiﬁed farmers.
This result is consistent with qualitative evidence based on interviews with both farmers
and exporters which suggest that the main determinant for certiﬁcation should be looked
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Table 2: Probit regression
Variable Coef. SE z P>z [95% CI]
number_zebu05 -0.01 0.02 -0.66 0.51 -0.04 0.02
farm_size05 0.00 0.01 -0.37 0.71 -0.03 0.02
litchi_worforce05 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.47 0.00 0.01
number_litchi05 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.52 0.00 0.00
litchi_sale05 0.00 0.00 3.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
head_of_hh_educ 0.41 0.18 2.27 0.02 0.05 0.76
contrat05 -0.30 0.29 -1.03 0.31 -0.86 0.27
early_produce_area 0.19 0.21 0.90 0.37 -0.22 0.59
cons -1.40 0.23 -6.20 0.00 -1.84 -0.95
on the exporter side.
Propensity score and common support From the parameter estimates of the probit
model, the propensity scores are calculated for every farmer, which are then used for the
matching analysis. We deﬁne the common support following Petra Todd's procedure: after
excluding points for which the estimated density is zero, we exclude an additional small
percentage of the remaining points for which the estimated density is positive but very
low. The graph of the distribution of propensity scores suggests that densities are high
enough for a wide range of propensity scores (see Figure 1).
Matching procedure and balancing tests Matching procedure is considered successful
when signiﬁcant diﬀerences of covariates among participants and non-participants are re-
moved. Table 3 displays means of covariates among GG farmers and EX certiﬁed farmers
(unmatched and matched) for the pre-treatment year 2005. After the matching procedure
has been applied, the diﬀerences between GG and EX are much smaller and there is no case
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5 per cent level. In addition, we test the balancing
property following the algorithm proposed by Becker and Ichino (2002). The balancing
property is satisﬁed in all cases.
5.2 Does certiﬁcation increase marketing performances of certiﬁed farm-
ers?
On average, currently certiﬁed producers receive about 400 ariary, which is not a (signif-
icantly) higher price than what their matched counterparts receive (see Table 8). Indeed,
we fail to detect an eﬀect signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (it appears smaller than 25 ariary
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Table 3: Unadjusted and adjusted means of covariates in 2005
controls untreated treated matched pvalue
contrat05 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.08
early_produce_area 0.74 0.76 0.71 0.26
farm_size05 5.32 5.37 5.44 0.93
head_of_hh_educ 0.43 0.63 0.63 exact
litchi_sale05 3.35 3.98 3.94 0.12
litchi_workforce05 20.00 22.02 17.32 0.08
number_litchi05 43.29 53.56 44.95 0.23
number_zebu05 2.48 2.27 1.29 0.15
Table 4: Impact of GlobalGAP on certiﬁed farmers' prices in 2009 (Fakra group only)
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 190.63 71.56 2.66 ***
nnm_1_x 125.00 84.29 1.48
nnm_4_ps 175.53 61.38 2.86 ***
nnm_4_x 185.94 67.60 2.75 ***
psm_kernel 170.79 67.88 2.52 **
psm_llr 176.88 80.42 2.20 **
ols_ps 170.83 44.01 3.88 ***
ols_x 177.30 44.31 4.00 ***
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
on average whatever the estimator considered, which is very small). This results conﬁrm
previous qualitative evidence which indicates that certiﬁcation does not guarantee price
premium at the exporter level either. Moreover, this result hides heterogeneous eﬀects,
namely a large eﬀect on prices received by the speciﬁc group called Fakra: they receive
about 530 ariary, 170 to 190 more than their matches depending on the estimator con-
sidered (see Table 4). The interpretation has yet to be further documented. However,
previous qualitative study suggests that this farmer group has speciﬁc organization (in
particular all of them are certiﬁed) which may help them negotiate better prices.
Main results of our analysis are displayed in Table 5. Results indicate that currently
certiﬁed producers sell larger quantities than their matched counterparts (ex-certiﬁed).
They sell about 5.6 tons, 1 to 1.6 tons more than their matches depending on the estimator
considered. Interestingly, matching on NEVER farmers leads to slightly larger estimates
(see Table 12), which suggests that our empirical strategy allowed us to correct for selection
bias due to unobservable characteristics of certiﬁed (or ex-certiﬁed) farmers - namely their
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Table 5: Impact of GlobalGAP on certiﬁed farmers' sales in 2009
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 1.26 0.61 2.06 **
nnm_1_x 1.61 0.65 2.48 **
nnm_4_ps 1.65 0.58 2.83 ***
nnm_4_x 1.53 0.61 2.52 **
psm_kernel 1.20 0.56 2.12 **
psm_llr 1.11 0.60 1.84 *
ols_ps 1.06 0.42 2.53 **
ols_x 0.96 0.41 2.33 **
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
ability to provide high quality products and their professional relationship with their buyer.
5.3 Do ex-certiﬁed farmers still beneﬁt from positive impact of certiﬁ-
cation?
Another question traditionally asked when studying food standard compliance is whether
exporters who want to increase the proportion of certiﬁed products tend to cheat by sourc-
ing ex-certiﬁed farmers. In other words, do ex-certiﬁed farmers still beneﬁt from positive
impact of certiﬁcation? The composition of the sample provides an opportunity to estimate
the impact of having been certiﬁed over the whole period, by comparing EX certiﬁed farm-
ers to NEVER certiﬁed ones. As argued above, such comparison, even based on matching
procedure, may lead to (positively) biased estimates because of unobservable character-
istics of EX farmers. And yet, the results show that EX farmers do not seem to sell
signiﬁcantly larger quantities than their matched counterparts (never-certiﬁed). Indeed,
as shown in Table 9, we fail to detect an eﬀect signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, except
when considering the LLR estimator, which suggests a small impact of +400 kg (but we
cannot exclude that this can be due to unobservable only).
Moreover, ex-certiﬁed producers seem to receive slightly higher prices than what their
matches receive (see Table 10). Although the diﬀerence appears signiﬁcant, it remains very
small (around 50 ariary). We ﬁnd similar results (although less stable) when matching
GG with NEVER (see Table 11). Obviously such results are related to unobservable
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characteristics which make (ex-)certiﬁed farmers diﬀerent from others - their ability to
supply higher quality products, for example.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis contributes to the empirical literature on the emergence of food standards by
focusing on the special case of the Malagasy litchi industry, characterized by a ﬂourishing
growth in ten years and compliance costs entirely supported by exporters themselves, often
with ﬁnancial support and technical assistance from donors and trade facilitators. In this
special case, contrary to common result in the literature, there is no indirect eviction of
no-certiﬁed farmers. Even if certiﬁed farmers tend to sell larger quantities, they are too
few to overshadow the other 20.000 Malagasy producers who supply the European market.
There is indeed a non-negligible positive impact for certiﬁed (1 to 1.3 ton more), but
this is almost uncorrelated to farmers performances since certiﬁcation is highly driven by
market forces (and external assistance). The recent slowdown in demand (resulting in the
implementation of quotas this year) could change that. Indeed, certiﬁcation may become
mandatory to ensure a place in the refeer to European markets.
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Table 8: Impact of GlobalGAP on certiﬁed farmers' prices in 2009
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps -9.66 37.71 -0.26
nnm_1_x -17.93 37.23 -0.48
nnm_4_ps 10.78 30.29 0.36
nnm_4_x 14.18 30.60 0.46
psm_kernel 19.87 25.84 0.77
psm_llr 17.28 28.82 0.60
ols_ps 21.70 24.94 0.87
ols_x 20.65 25.11 0.82
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
Table 9: Impact of GlobalGAP on EX-certiﬁed farmers' sales in 2009
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 0.35 0.32 1.11
nnm_1_x 0.20 0.30 0.68
nnm_4_ps -0.29 0.45 -0.63
nnm_4_x -0.29 0.46 -0.62
psm_kernel 0.30 0.21 1.43
psm_llr 0.37 0.22 1.68 *
ols_ps -0.24 0.31 -0.77
ols_x -0.20 0.29 -0.67
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
Table 10: Impact of GlobalGAP on EX-certiﬁed farmers' prices in 2009
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 50.45 20.82 2.42 **
nnm_1_x 61.15 22.77 2.69 ***
nnm_4_ps 59.89 18.16 3.30 ***
nnm_4_x 49.78 17.74 2.81 ***
psm_kernel 47.39 15.22 3.11 ***
psm_llr 45.78 17.59 2.60 ***
ols_ps 43.22 15.09 2.86 ***
ols_x 44.60 14.86 3.00 ***
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
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Table 11: Impact of GlobalGAP on certiﬁed farmers' prices in 2009 comparing with never-
certiﬁed matched counterparts
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 103.90 33.09 3.14 ***
nnm_1_x 110.85 32.25 3.44 ***
nnm_4_ps 85.32 30.22 2.82 ***
nnm_4_x 94.53 29.74 3.18 ***
psm_kernel 68.98 29.03 2.38 **
psm_llr 58.01 47.99 1.21
ols_ps 76.65 24.76 3.10 ***
ols_x 74.12 24.43 3.03 ***
note: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
Table 12: Impact of GlobalGAP on certiﬁed farmers' sales in 2009 comparing with never-
certiﬁed matched counterparts
estimator att se stat
nnm_1_ps 1.60 0.82 1.94 *
nnm_1_x 1.61 0.82 1.96 **
nnm_4_ps 1.67 0.74 2.27 **
nnm_4_x 1.72 0.78 2.20 **
psm_kernel 1.06 0.83 1.28
psm_llr 1.13 0.96 1.17
ols_ps 0.96 0.73 1.30
ols_x 1.01 0.67 1.50
note1: Fakra group excluded from sample.
note2: exact matching on litchi_sale05,
head_of_hh_educ
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores among GG and EX
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